The work presents a Convertible Multi-Authenticated Encryption (CMAE) scheme based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The proposed scheme intended to develop the CMAE scheme to improve performance as compared to the other existing schemes. Most of CMAE scheme are very high at computational overhead and memory usage problem. This scheme desired to reduce time-consuming problem by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). In addition, the proposed scheme provides good resistance to the chosen plain-text attacks and which is proven to be secure. As for efficiency, the computation cost of the proposed scheme is smaller than the existing schemes, such as Lu et al.'s scheme.
Introduction
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme used for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, such that the sender cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and non-repudiation) and that the message was not altered in transition (integrity). Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a block cipher mode of operation which simultaneously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity assurances on the data; decryption is combined in a single step with integrity validation. These attributes are provided under a single and easy-to-use programming interface. An AE scheme allows one signer to generate an authenticated ciphertext such that only a designated recipient has the ability to decrypt the signed message and verify its corresponding signature.
To send a message by a secure approach through a broadcast channel, the authenticated encryption scheme was proposed by Horster et al. (1994) in which only the specific recipient can recover the original message from an authenticated ciphertext signature produced by a signer and verify its integrity. Unfortunately, a later dispute over repudiation occurred because of the loss of public verification. To address this problem, Araki et al. (1998) proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme without revealing the designated verifier's private key or performing the zeroknowledge protocol. Their scheme can be recognised as a new type of AE scheme and called the Convertible Authenticated Encryption (CAE) scheme. Many AE schemes and variation have been proposed in Wu and Hsu (2002) , Chien (2003) , Zhang and Wang (2005) , and Sudha and Bhavani (2014) . Wu et al. (2008) elaborated encryption on the merits of the CAE and the multi-signature schemes to propose a Convertible Multi-Authenticated Encryption (CMAE), in which only the designated recipient can easily derive the original message from the ciphertext that has been produced by a multi-signer and verify its validity. Moreover, the converted ciphertext signature can be released in case of later dispute over repudiation to convince any verifier of the dishonesty of the signing group.
Based on Wu et al.'s (2008) Lu et al.'s (2014) proposed a secure CMAE based on discrete logarithm problem, in which they enhanced the semantics security of the message to overcome the defect in Tasi's scheme.
The operations associated with the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are more efficient than those associated with other cryptosystems, like the RSA and the DSA security solutions. Owing to the fact that the ECC has a smaller key size and faster computation, for this reason, in this paper we had the motivation to design a new CMAE scheme based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Moreover, the proposed scheme provides the semantic security and it can be used in various cryptographic protocols where the anonymity of the requester is required.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,we propose our new CMAE scheme. In Section 3, we analyse the security and performance of the new scheme. Next, we present a small example of our scheme and this can be found in Section 4. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
The proposed CMAE scheme
In this section, a CMAE scheme with verifiable based on ECDLP is proposed. The proposed scheme is divided into four phases: initialisation phase, signature encryption phase, message recovery and signature conversion phases; these phases are designed as follows:
System initialisation phase
For the convenience of describing of the proposed technique, they are defined as the parameters follows: 
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The message recovery phase
Upon receiving   1 2 , , , , C C T W  from the client U k , the designated recipient U v performs the following three steps:
 Recover the chosen message M by computing 
The signature conversion phase
In case of a later dispute regarding repudiation, U v can release
With this converted signature, anyone can easily verify:
Correctness of the proposed scheme
The correctness of the proposed scheme is shown in the following theorems. Proof: Firstly, the value L can be recovered using equation (15):
Then, the message M can be recovered using equation ( 
Security analysis and performance evaluation
Security analysis and computational complexity of the proposed scheme are given below.
Security analysis
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the wellknown cryptographic assumptions which are: solving the ECDLP and the intractability of reversing the OWHF (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) . In the following we discuss some possible attacks against the proposed scheme and show that the proposed scheme is secure under the protection of the ECDLP and OWHF assumption. (14) and (15), since x v is protected under the ECDLP assumption.
2 The attacker tries to forge an authenticated encryption signature.
To forge a signature for satisfying equation (16) 
is able to protect the secret message using signer's two parameters,  i and  i , such that it is impossible for any attacker to obtain the chosen message M from . 
In general, = , ,
which lead to:
and each signer's public key y i has no idea about the specific recipient's private key x v and individual private key x i plus random number  i . Hence, it is infeasible to output the original message M such that the proposed scheme can satisfy the indistinguishability of the confidentialty.
4 In order to protect the interests of designated recipient, the proposed scheme sets a message conversion phase to ensure that anyone can verify the validity of the converted ciphertext signature and message in case that the signing group repudiates on it. Furthermore, the converted verification equation provides an adversary with no chance of setting up the chosen plain-text attacks such that the proposed scheme can satisfy the non-repudiation.
Performance evaluation
This section discusses the computational complexity performance of the proposed CMAE scheme. For facilitating the computational complexity, the following notations are defined (Nehru and Shanmugam, 2014; Contini et al., 2006) : The equivalence of the time complexity for various operation units in terms of T mul is given in Table 2 according to what is given in Koblitz et al. (2002) , Tahat et al. (2008) , Servos et al. (2013) , and Henock et al. (2015) . 
Lu et al. proposed a robust CMAE scheme with OWHF. In their scheme, they showed that Tsai's scheme cannot provide the semantic security for the message. To overcome this problem Lu et al. proposed a secure CMAE scheme based on the OWHF and DLP. Therefore, In order to prove the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we compare the performance with Lu et al.'s scheme for the three phases and for the system overall. The performance evaluation of the two schemes is described in Table 1 . Thus, we conclude that the proposed scheme is more efficient than Lu et al.'s in terms of computational complexity. Therefore, the proposed scheme can substantially enhance the efficiency of signature encryption, message recovery and verification. We will apply our example on three users signing group; each users choose 
